Part 3: 11 Lithuanian KGB Counterintel Ops Against the West in 1955
Clandestine operations of KGB agents dispatched to the West revealed in the archives.
7. Agent KEY
This was another operation named after the main protagonist like the operation involving a KGB agent YUNSKAYA discussed in Part 2.1 Once again, the ultimate target was British intelligence.
In this operation, the main protagonist was a KGB agent codenamed KEY. He was a former employee of the British oil company Shell based in Kaunas, the capital of the pre-WWII Lithuania. According to Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence, KEY had been acquainted with the personnel of the former British Consulate in Kaunas, especially the individuals named Hartford, Sachs, and Fadeyev, who were suspected of working for the British intelligence service, MI6.
Given that KEY still had a bank account in his own name in a British bank, Lithuanian KGB instructed him to write a letter to the Shell headquarters in London. He was then told to give this letter to a KGB agent codenamed GINTARAS who had contacts with foreign sailors in the Lithuanian port city of Klaipeda.
However, instead of giving the letter to a foreign sailor, GINTARAS passed it on to yet another KGB agent codenamed BORTSOV. BORTSOV was a Soviet sailor who posted the letter in Liverpool when his ship entered that British port. In this way, the letter escaped the attention of the Soviet postal service and potential interception and censorship by those in the KGB who were not read into the operation.
Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence informed Fedotov in Moscow that it was preparing another letter for BORTSOV to pass on to the British port officials that the KGB suspected had ties with British counterintelligence. The expectation was that this would elicit their interest in cultivating further contacts with BORTSOV and KEY.
8. Dispatch of Agent SCHULTZ
This operation involved sending a KGB agent codenamed SCHULTZ to the West German city of Hanover to infiltrate the German anti-Soviet organization called the “Memler-Bund.”
The “Memler-Bund” was set up by former German residents of the Klaipeda region in Lithuania (Memel in German). Many Germans living in this region were forced to leave Lithuania for Germany after World War Two. The Soviets euphemistically referred to this process as “repatriation,” though most of these people never lived in Germany before. In other words, this was a clear form of ethnic cleansing.
According to Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence, SCHULTZ had relatives and friends who were members of the “Memler-Bund” in Hanover, and they expected to gain valuable information about German plans from his planned infiltration.
9. Dangling of Agent KARIUNAS
This operation envisioned having a Lithuanian KGB agent codenamed KARIUNAS as a dangle to West German intelligence.
KARIUNAS was described as a former officer in the Lithuanian army who, during World War Two, had friendly relations with German intelligence (Sicherheitsdienst - SD) officers named Katelius and Shchegauskas based in the Lithuanian cities of Vilnius and Kaunas. Just like KARIUNAS, Shchegauskas was also a former officer in the Lithuanian army. According to KGB, he and Katelius were living in West Germany.
KARIUNAS was also a friend of a man named Lauris, described as formerly a wealthy landlord, who, as an ethnic German from the Klaipeda region, was “repatriated” to West Germany. KGB instructed KARIUNAS to ask Lauris to look for Katelius and Shchegauskas and convey to them KARIUNAS’s greetings as well as his offer to facilitate communication between Katelius and his mother in Lithuania.
Lithuanian KGB’s expectation was that these interactions would likely be under surveillance by West German intelligence and would generate their interest in making a contact with KARIUNAS.
In addition, Lithuanian KGB informed Fedotov that they had used the German “repatriation” process to dangle to West German intelligence six other agents codenamed POLAUSKAS, PATRAS, KARSHAS, ULAND, EKO, and LOKIS. Evidently, KGB considered “repatriation” a gold mine for espionage opportunities.
10. Recruiting a Former German Intelligence Officer
Just like Operation SCANDINAVIA discussed in Part 1, this operation shows that the Lithuanian KGB was willing to recruit the former intelligence officers of the Nazi regime and their collaborators when this suited their counterintelligence aims against the West.
Tsirpinsky was described as a former German intelligence officer who worked for the German military attaché at the German Consulate in Kaunas from 1939 to 1941. His task was to collect information about the Soviet Red Army and organize illegal transfers of people across the border to Germany. He continued his work for the German Army intelligence [not the Abwehr] for the whole duration of World War Two.
According to Lithuanian KGB, in the 1950s, Tsirpinsky was employed as an instructor at an autoworkers’ training school in the East German city of Zwickau, the key production site for German automobile industry where the “legendary” East German car Trabant was made. Since he appeared to be a figure known to West German intelligence, KGB intended to turn him using a person close to him, his first cousin from Lithuania. After the recruitment, they planned to dangle him back to West German intelligence.
Tsirpinsky’s cousin lived in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius and was recruited as an agent codenamed TSARYOV. He was tasked to travel to Zwickau to meet with Tsirpinsky accompanied by a Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence officer.
This operation reveals that Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence ran recruitment operations in East Germany without any coordination or even notification of the East German Ministry of State Security, the notorious Stasi.
11. Preparatory Measures for Recruitment of Albinas Molis
Just like the previous operation, this one also involved the recruitment of a person who resided in a foreign country, in this case, Great Britain.
Albinas Molis was a former officer of the Lithuanian army who fought against the Soviets as a member of the armed Lithuanian underground resistance and was later able to escape successfully to the West. He was placed on the Lithuanian KGB Wanted List.
In 1955, Molis turned up at the Soviet Embassy in London asking for permission to visit Lithuania. According to Lithuanian KGB, he was debriefed at the Embassy and provided certain information which they deemed worthy of interest. He was then allowed to send a letter to his wife whom he had left behind in Vilnius.
Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence informed Fedotov that it had taken steps to obtain and read Molis’s letter. They also initiated the surveillance (perlustration) of his wife’s potential future correspondence with him.
Conclusion
The main takeaway from this 3-part article series on Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence operations against the West in 1955 is that these operations primarily targeted U.S., British, and West German intelligence services and anti-Soviet émigré organizations in West Germany and United Kingdom. The preferred mode of operation was recruiting agents among the individuals considered to be able to deceive the adversarial services, irrespective of age, gender, social status, and ethnicity.
“Докладная записка об агентурно-оперативной работе 2 отдела КГБ при СМ Литовской ССР за 1955 г. [A Report on Agent-Operational Work of the 2nd Department of the KGB Attached to the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR for 1955],” Fond K-1, Op. 3, File 573, pp. 63-120. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution. I gratefully acknowledge the Hoover Institution Library & Archives as an essential resource in the development of these materials. The views expressed in this publication are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, staff, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.